Truth or a blatant accusation of Crimes against Humanity on Ukrainians: The Jurisdictional constraints affecting international prosecutions with accountability challenges despite strong evidentiary

Paper Code: AIJACLAV05RP2026

Category: Research Paper

Date of Publication: Sep 10, 2026

Citation: Mr. Bipro Pratim Das, “Truth or a blatant accusation of Crimes against Humanity on Ukrainians: The Jurisdictional constraints affecting international prosecutions with accountability challenges despite strong evidentiary foundation", 6, AIJACLA, 33-50 (2026), <https://www.aequivic.in/post/truth-or-a-blatant-accusation-of-crimes-against-humanity-on-ukrainians-the-jurisdictional-constrain>

Author Details: Mr. Bipro Pratim Das, Research Scholar, The W.B National University of Juridical Sciences Kolkata, India

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Abstract

This Art examines whether the conduct of Russian forces and occupation authorities in Ukraine amounts to crimes against humanity (CAH) under Art. 7 ICC Statute. Drawing upon the reports of the UN investigative bodies, Human Rights Watch and the documented case studies of Ukrainian civilians, the study analyses the patterns of violence beyond isolated violations of international criminal law (ICL). It argues that the scale, repetition and coordination of acts such as enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence, deportation, persecution and inhumane treatment plausibly meet the legal threshold of a widespread or systematic attack carried out with the knowledge of that attack. This Art has situated CAH within ICL emphasizing that unlike war crimes, such offences do not require a nexus to armed conflict. Through an examination of occupation practices in the regions such as Kherson, Crimea, Donbas and Kyiv, the Art demonstrates how individual incidents like enforced disappearance of activists, journalists and humanitarian volunteers form a part of a broader policy of repression aimed at suppressing Ukrainian civic identity and resistance. The Art aims at finding answers to three research objectives, at first, it analyses the extent to which the pattern of conduct by Russian forces and occupation authorities in Ukraine satisfy the contextual and material elements of CAH; secondly, to find out how does such atrocities function as interconnected components of a widespread and systematic attack against the Ukrainian civilian population; lastly, to understand the legal implications and accountability-challenges arising from jurisdictional, political and evidentiary constraints in prosecuting CAH committed in the context of Ukraine conflict with the case laws. The scope of this Art is limited to CAH and does not engage in a full legal qualification of genocide or war crimes except where contextually relevant. It relies on publicly available documentation and does not assess individual criminal responsibility beyond doctrinal analysis. Jurisdictional constraints affecting international prosecutions are acknowledged underscoring the challenges of accountability despite a strong evidentiary foundation.

Keywords: Crimes against Humanity, Russia-Ukraine, International Criminal Law, Jurisdiction, Accountability, Armed Conflict.

Paper Code: AIJACLAV05RP2026

I.                    Understanding the contextual and material elements of CAH satisfying its commission vis-à-vis Ukrainian territory:

Understanding ‘crimes against humanity’ (hereinafter CAH)[1] means those act(s)[2] committed as a part of the widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with the knowledge of such attack defined in Art 7 ICC Statute including torture, deportation, rape etc.[3] Before the Rome Statute, CAH was codified in the 1945 Nuremberg Charter while ‘war crime’ was much previously rooted in the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions which had been the oldest pre-existing international crime since the Red Cross convention of 1864.[4] The CAH comprises of those atrocities that have been a part of the discriminatory procedure or prosecutions committed by nationals of one country against their fellow citizens or against those of other nations, irrespective of their belligerent status.[5]

The only threshold formulated within the elements of the CAH is that it must be widespread and systematic in nature, and must be directed against any civilian population. The forced deportation of thousands of Ukrainian civilians, including children, to Russian-occupied territories or mainland Russia constitutes a CAH.[6] The ICC’s arrest warrants against supreme Russian officials including President Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, for the unlawful transfer of children have a more directory in nature than being a mandate as it lacks the persuasive effect for want of implementation. ICC issued the arrest warrant on the basis of the reports  of the Human Rights Watch(HRW), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) which have documented multiple incidents of rape and other forms of sexual violence perpetrated by Russian forces against civilians, often used as a weapon of war.[7] Ukrainian authorities and investigative journalists have reported that ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars (indigenous Turkic people of Crimea) have been disproportionately targeted with detention, abuse, and property confiscation in occupied areas, raising the concern of ethnically motivated persecution.[8]

There are reports suggesting that thousands of Ukrainians been unlawfully detained in filtration camps in the Donbas region and subjected to disappearances, lacking any legal protections or trial.[9] Based on the UN report published by the Atlantic Council written by Peter Dickinson, it has been concluded that Russia was guilty of committing CAH in Ukraine and its occupied territory.[10] The large-scale programme of detentions and deportations under Russian occupation targeting Ukrainian civilians have led to the confirmation of the earlier reports focusing on Putin's invasion.[11] In a report published by the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine published on March 19 observed that "the enforced disappearances against civilians were perpetrated pursuing to a coordinated state policy and it amounts to CAH."[12] The report very well depicts an atmosphere of lawlessness in Ukraine caused by the Russian invasion, in which anyone, if viewed as a potential threat, was found to be detained, suddenly disappeared or faced imminent deportation to the Russian Federation. Similar evidences surfaced showed mass detentions uncovered throughout all regions of Ukraine under the Kremlin-control indicated that there was systematic attack against civilian population. This UN report suggested that the victims included journalists, military veterans, local officials, religious leaders, civic activists were targeted in a widespread and systematic manner as CAH is in itself not an isolated crime but it has to be coupled with the knowledge of the attack. While delving down deep into the reports published by reputed non-governmental institutions, there are substantial indications showing the commission of CAH, inter alia, other international crimes.

The HRW World Report of 2024 revealed that since February 2022, thousands of civilians had been killed or injured, and millions displaced internally or across borders.[13] The scale and continuity of the violence demonstrate more than episodic violations of IHL. They reveal conduct capable of satisfying the legal threshold for CAH under Art 7.[14] The CAH requires the commission of the enumerated acts as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population with the knowledge of such attack.[15] The contextual elements do not demand the existence of an armed attack nor proof of a formal state plan.[16] What is required is the evidence of organized violence directed primarily at civilians. The investigations conducted by the UN bodies indicate that this threshold has plausibly met in multiple regions of Ukraine.[17] The Russian armed forces have repeatedly carried out attacks using explosive weapons in densely populated areas including the residential buildings, hospitals, schools and energy infrastructure were struck across the country.[18] These attacks have resulted in prolonged electricity outages and disrupted access to health care, education and basic services.[19] When such harm is inflicted on a large scale and affects civilians as a group, it shall constitute a murder or other inhumane acts under Art 7(1)(a) and (k).[20] Some specific incidents illustrate a broader pattern. The missile strikes witnessed in Dnipro, Kramatorsk, Kryvyi Rih, Lviv and Odesa caused mass civilian casualties and extensive destruction of non-military objects.[21] In and around the bombarded areas, the investigations revealed that any plea of mistargets could not be justified as there were no military facilities in the vicinity and that the Russian weapons were ill-suited for use in the populated areas.[22] These findings support the inference that the civilian harm was not incidental but were foreseeable and was tolerated as the strikes in October 2023 on Ukraine’s Hroza village further reinforces this conclusion. Fifty-nine civilians were killed while attending a funeral.[23] The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission found no evidence of a legitimate military target nearby.[24] Such conduct, hence reflects an attack directed against civilians within the meaning of Art 7(2)(a).[25] 

It was seen that beyond the battlefield violence the Russian forces had engaged in systematic practices of arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance and torture in occupied territories. Civilians perceived as loyal to Ukraine were charged for interrogation and abuse.[26] The UN documentation have indicated that torture was used routinely rather than exceptionally.[27] The torture committed as part of the widespread or systematic attack constitutes a CAH under Art 7(1)(f).[28] The sexual violence formed part of this pattern of abuse where the Ukrainian authorities and international investigators have documented numerous cases of rape and other forms of sexual violence committed in occupied areas and detention facilities.[29] Such acts fall squarely within Art 7(1)(g) when committed in connection with a broader attack against civilians.[30] The use of sexual violence as a method of intimidation and punishment further supports the existence of an organizational policy as there were no prosecutions by Russia against the offenders who committed such a war crime, although war crime is not within the scope of this paper. Having relied on such reports the ICC, in March 2023, issued an arrest warrant against senior Russian officials after being satisfied that there were prima facie grounds for trial in relation to these acts, but the irony being that such document of arrest warrant was never disclosed in public.

The destruction of Kakhovka hydroelectric dam in June 2023 caused extensive flooding, environmental damage and civilian suffering.[31] The Russian authorities had restricted humanitarian access in the occupied areas and had failed to carry out timely evacuations.[32] The deliberate creation of such conditions endangering the civilian survival may qualify as an inhumane act under Art 7(1)(k) when it is link to a brother attack on civilians.[33] The Russian forces also made extensive use of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions as well. The large areas of Ukraine remain contaminated posing the long-term risk to civilian life.[34] While the Ukrainian forces have also been implicated in limited violations the UN bodies consistently attribute the overwhelming majority of abuses to Russian forces.[35] This asymmetry is relevant in assessing the scale and systematic nature of the attack. In the occupied Crimea, repression assumed a prolonged and institutionalized form. Crimean Tatars and other perceived opponents of the occupation was subjected to arbitrary arrests, where the politically motivated prosecutions and denial of medical care was witnessed.[36] This coercive imposition of Russian citizenship and suppression of the Ukrainian language and culture amounts to persecution under Art 7(1)(h).[37]

The abuse of prisoners of war also demonstrates the normalisation of the unlawful violence where the Ukrainian prisoners were subjected to torture, inhumane detention conditions and sham prosecutions.[38] Although these acts were classically categorized as war crimes, but their systematic nature contributes to establishing the broader context required in CAH.[39] The evidences taken together demonstrate the presence of all the contextual elements of the CAH under the ICC statute. The acts were widespread affecting the large number of civilians across multiple regions. They were systematic and this reflected recurring practices over time. The systematic acts were directed primarily against civilian populations where such acts were committed with the knowledge of the attack and, in several cases, these directions were part of Russian State policy.[40] This accountability continues through international and domestic mechanisms, despite of the jurisdictional constraints which limit the scope of prosecutions before the ICC. Nevertheless, the legal characterization of Russia’s conduct as potentially constituting CAH rests on the firm evidentiary and doctrinal foundation grounded in Art.7.[41]

While the HRW World Report[42] (2025) suggested that Russia's conduct during the ongoing armed conflict in Ukraine raises sustained questions under the law of CAH. Since February 2022, the Russian military and occupation authorities have engaged in patterns of conduct resulting in extensive civilian harm across multiple regions of Ukraine. The legal relevance of these acts lies not in their occurrence during an armed conflict, but in whether they satisfy the contextual and material elements required for CAH under ICL. Unlike war crimes, the CAH do not require a nexus to armed conflict.[43] The decisive inquiry is whether the violence forms part of an organized source of conduct involving the multiple commission of prohibited acts against civilians.[44] Recent findings by the international investigative bodies increasingly support the conclusion that this threshold maybe satisfied in the Ukrainian context.[45] 

The scale of civilian harm is central to assessing the widespread character of the alleged attack. Between February 2022 and November 2024, more than 12,000 civilians were reportedly killed and approximately 27,000 injured with millions forcibly displaced.[46] The geographic dispersion of these harms across both frontline and rear areas suggest a pattern extending beyond localised or sporadic incidents. In 2024, renewed hostilities in eastern Ukraine resulting in further large-scale displacement, reinforcing the cumulative nature of civilian victimization. Such figures are legally relevant insofar as they demonstrate the large-scale dimension required by Art 7 (2)(a).[47] 

On the other hand, the evidence indicates a degree of coordination consistent with a systematic attack. During 2024, the Russian forces conducted repeated strikes against Ukraine’s national energy infrastructure, significantly reducing electricity production and causing prolonged blackouts affecting millions of civilians.[48] These attacks were not isolated but formed a part of a sustained campaign over several months. When intentionally directed at objects indispensable to civilian life and carried out on a large scale such conduct may fall within the scope of ‘other inhumane acts’ under Art 7 (1)(k).[49] The issuance of arrest warrants by the ICC against senior Russian officials in connection with these attacks underscores their potential relevance under crimes against humanity jurisprudence.[50] The manner in which force has been employed further supports this characterization. Throughout 2024, Russian forces repeatedly used explosive weapons with wide-area effects in densely populated areas, resulting in extensive civilian casualties and damage to protected civilian objects, including hospitals, schools and cultural institutions.[51] July 2024 recorded the highest monthly civilian death in two years following coordinated missile strikes across multiple cities including the destruction of Kyiv's principle paediatric hospital.[52] Such acts when assessed engage the prohibition of murder under Art 7, (1)(a).[53] The foreseeability of civilian harm is legally significant when evaluating the knowledge element of CAH. Investigations frequently revealed either the absence of proximate military objectives or the use of weapons incapable of distinguishing between civilians and combatants.[54] Under the established jurisprudence, knowledge may be inferred where perpetrators are aware that their acts formed part of a broader attack against civilians.[55] In territories under Russian occupation violations assumed a more institutionalized form, the Russian authorities imposed domestic legal framework, administrative systems and judicial processes in occupied regions, contrary to the law of occupation.[56] Civilians were subjected to coercive measures aimed at compelling the acquisition of Russian citizenship, including restrictions on the access to essential services.[57] These practices are relevant to the CAH of persecution under Art 7(1)(h) particularly when linked to other prohibited acts.[58]

Suppression of dissent illustrates the systematic nature of attacks. The journalists, educators, religious leaders and humanitarian volunteers were arbitrarily detained for refusing to cooperate with occupation authorities.[59] Ukrainian language education was dismantled and replaced with Russian curriculum; evidencing a ‘discriminatory intent’ just observed in the Prosecutor v. Katanga case.[60] Such measures when carried out on political or national grounds, contribute to the crimes of persecution within the meaning of Art 7.[61] In Crimea, these practices intensified existing patterns of repression. Crimean Tatars and other perceived opponents of the occupation were subjected to criminal prosecution, professional retaliation and denial of medical care.[62] The continuity of these practices before and after February 2022 is relevant in establishing the persistence of a systematic attack rather than the emergence of isolated wartime abuses. 

The treatment of detainees provides further evidence of CAH. The Russian forces summarily executed Ukrainian soldiers attempting to surrender and subjected prisoners of war and civilians to torture, sexual violence and inhuman detention conditions.[63] In 2024, the UN Inquiry Commission concluded that torture committed by Russian authorities against civilians and prisoners of war not only prima facie but an established CAH.[64] Torture constitutes  CAH under Art 7(1)(f) when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack.[65] Conflict-related sexual violence has likewise been documented as a recurring feature of detention and occupation. Ukrainian authorities have opened hundreds of investigations into sexual violence attributed to Russian forces affecting women, men and children.[66] When implied to punish, intimidate or extract information, sexual violence satisfies the elements of Art 7(1)(g).[67]  The unlawful detention and enforced disappearance were also widely reported. Thousands of civilians were detained without charge; there was denial of a trial guarantees and subject to coercive interrogation.[68] Such conduct directly engages the CAH of imprisonment and enforced disappearance under Art 7 (1)(e) and (i).[69] 

If it can be assessed carefully the evidence indicates the presence of the contextual elements required for CAH under the ICC Statute. The acts described were large-scale in nature, recurrent across time and territory, and primarily directed against civilian populations. They were committed with awareness of a broader attack, and in several context, pursuant to identifiable state or organisational policies.[70] While jurisdictional and political constraints continue to impede comprehensive accountability, the legal characterization of Russian conduct as potentially constituting CAH rests on a strong doctrinal foundation grounded in Art 7 and supported by an extensive evidentiary record.[71]

II. Russian atrocities functioning as interconnected components of a widespread and systematic attack against the Ukrainian civilian population:

The documented practice of enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture and forcible transfer of civilians reflects an organized campaign directed against segments of Ukrainian civilian population. These acts required legal characterization within the framework of CAH  as Art 7 ICC Statute has enumerated acts committed as part of widespread or systematic attack directed against civilian population with the knowledge of the attack.[72] The contextual elements are central and the existence of an armed conflict is not determinative.[73] Evidence concerning enforced disappearance of Ukrainian civilians including journalists, activists, humanitarian volunteers and local officials demonstrate both qualitative and quantitative scale of organization. From the earliest weeks of the invasion, the Russian armed forces and their affiliated actors abducted civilians from their homes or public spaces in occupied territories.[74] These individuals were detained without warrants, held incommunicado and were denied access to legal safeguards. The families were not informed of their whereabouts[75] and such conduct corresponds closely to the definition of enforced disappearance recognized under ICL.[76] Such cases were documented in Kyiv region, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea.[77] The number of victims reached into the hundreds by mid-2022 and continued to rise thereafter.[78] This scale exceeds the threshold of isolated or sporadic violations and satisfies the widespread element under Art 7.[79] This systematic nature of the attack is evident from recurring methods as the victims were often individuals perceived as opposing the occupation or maintaining Ukrainian civic identity. Participation in peaceful protests, delivery of humanitarian assistance or public expression of pro-Ukrainian views frequently preceded abduction.[80] Such selection indicates purposeful targeting rather than incidental harm. Under international jurisprudence the patterns of repetition and coordination are sufficient to established systematicity.[81] Enforced disappearance is expressly recognized as CAH under Art 7(1)(i) of the ICC statute.[82] The offence requires arrest or detention by or with the acquiescence of a State followed by the refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the victim, with an intent to remove the person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period.[83] The documented conduct of Russian forces meets each of these elements. 

Evidences have surfaced showing that there was state involvement into the participation of regular armed forces occupation authorities and the affiliated security structures.[84] Detention facilities were often located in official buildings including police stations and military premises.[85] The victims were transferred across borders to detention facilities in the Russian Federation or Belarus.[86] Such cross-border transfer further demonstrates the involvement of state institutions and negate claims of rogue or unauthorized behaviour. The prolonged incommunicado detention of disappeared persons exposes victims to heightened risk of torture and ill treatment. There are testimonies which consistently describe beatings, mock executions, threats of sexual violence and psychological abuse.[87] Torture when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians constitutes a distinct CAH under Art 7 (1)(f).[88] The Commission of Inquiry and other monitored bodies concluded that torture was not incidental but structurally embedded in detention practices.[89] The sexual violence was also documented in detention context where the victims included both men and women.[90] Such acts were used as tools of intimidation and coercion. When it was assessed within the broader attacks on civilians, these acts fall within Art 7 (1)(g) of the Rome statute.[91] Another relevant CAH is the arbitrary imprisonment. Art 7 (1)(e) prohibits severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law.[92] The absence of legal grounds, judicial oversight or access to counsel in these cases satisfies this element.[93] The victims were often detained for months without charge or trial. The forcible transfer and deportation further reinforce the CAH framework. The civilians were moved from occupied Ukrainian territory to detention centres inside the Russian federation.[94] Such transfers were carried out without lawful justification and against the will of the victims. The deportation of forcible transfer of population constitutes a CAH under Art 7(1)(d).[95] Persecution is also implicated where Arts 7 (1)(h) criminalises severe deprivation of fundamental rights by reason of political, national or ethnic identity.[96] The targeting of the human rights defenders and the civil activists because of their perceived loyalty to Ukraine reflects the discriminatory intent.[97] These acts were committed in connection with other crimes enumerated in Art 7 thus satisfying the legal requirements for persecution.[98] It can be said that the mental element required for crimes against humanity is established through the perpetrator’s awareness of the broader attack. The knowledge may be inferred from different circumstances.[99] The repetitive nature of the conduct, the use of official facilities and the consistency of victim profiles support such inference where the individual perpetrators need not possess knowledge of all the details of the attack. The awareness that their acts formed part of a larger campaign against civilians is sufficient[100] to attract the mental element required for the commission of CAH. The enforced disappearances and associated abuses documented in occupied Ukraine constitute a widespread and systematic attack against civilian population. The conductor aligns squarely with multiple categories of CAH under Art 7 of the Rome Statute. These findings carry significant implications for international criminal accountability despite the jurisdictional limitations affecting the ICC for enforcing action against perpetrators.[101] 

The abduction, disappearance and detention of the Ukrainian Human Rights defenders and other civilians were perceived as resisting Russian authority constitutes more than isolated violations. The patterns of conduct demonstrates both breadth and coordination where the affected individuals belong to diverse civilian categories. The methods employed show striking consistency across different regions. These features indicate conduct that forms part of widespread and systematic attack directed against the civilian population.[102] The geographic dispersion of enforced disappearances across occupied Ukrainian territory have supported the conclusion that the attack was widespread. The victims were abducted in urban centres, rural community and contested regions. The diversity of those targeted is equally significant as the journalists, humanitarian volunteers, local officials and ordinary civilians were all subject to similar treatment.[103] Such diversity is inconsistent with random or opportunistic conduct as it instead reflects a coordinated campaign aimed at suppressing perceived opposition to Russian control. The consistency in the perpetrators’ conduct further supports the systematic character of the attack where the victims were typically seized by armed forces wearing military uniforms. They were detained without warrants and were denied access to legal counsel. The families were left without information and these methods were repeated across multiple locations. Within this broader attack the enforced disappearance emerges as a central crime against humanity. The element requiring the deprivation of liberty is clearly satisfied where the ICL interprets arrest, detention and abduction broadly. Any involuntary deprivation of liberty falls within this category. The documented cases involve civilians forcibly taken by Russian soldiers or by armed actors operating under Russian occupation. None of the victims consented to their removal and the liberty was taken against their will.

The perpetrators included regular Russian military forces and affiliated actors operating in occupied territories which clearly suggests state involvement as a relevant factor.[104] In several cases the detainees were transferred to facilities located within the Russian federation.[105] Such transfers could not occur without State authorization. The ICC has recognized that military forces, intelligence services and armed groups implementing the state policy qualify as state agents for the purposes of Art 7.[106] The second element of enforced disappearance concerns the refusal to acknowledge detention or to disclose information regarding the victim's fate or whereabouts. This element is satisfied where the authorities deny detention outrightly or provide false or incomplete information.[107] The international human rights jurisprudence confirms that the States have a positive obligation to investigate disappearances ex officio and to inform families regardless of whether a formal complaint has been filed.[108]

In the Ukrainian cases, the families routinely received no official information and there were some instances where the authorities acknowledged detention only after several months. Even then, they refused to disclose the detainee's precise location.[109] In other cases, the detention has not been acknowledged at all and such conduct constitutes a continuing violation. It also aggravates the suffering of relatives, who are themselves recognised as indirect victims under international law.[110] The final element requires intends to remove the victim from the protection of the law for a prolong period. This intent maybe inferred from circumstantial evidence.[111] The detention without judicial oversight, the transfer to secret or unofficial facilities and the removal across borders all indicates such intent.[112] The Rome Statute does not define the precise duration required, however, the Pre Trial Chamber has clarified the detention lasting several months clearly satisfies the requirement.[113] Beyond the enforced disappearance the same conduct also supports the crimes against humanity of imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty under Art 7 (1)(e).[114] This crime required severe deprivation of liberty in violation of the fundamental rules of international law.[115] The detention without new process without legal basis and without judicial review constitutes such a violation.[116] Unlike enforced disappearance this crime does not require prolonged detention and hence even short-term arbitrary detention may suffice if it violates the fundamental norms.[117] 

The conditions of detention for the reinforce the criminal character of the conduct. There are numerous detainees who were subjected to torture and inhuman treatment and such treatment violets the peremptory norms of international law.[118] If this is committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack, the torture itself constitutes a separate CAHunder Art 7(1)(f).[119] This targeting of the human rights defenders and the perceived political opponents also raises the same CAHof persecution under Art 7 (1)(h).[120] Such persecutions involve the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights by reason of the identity of a group.[121] Political opinion constitutes a protected ground.[122] The ICL recognises that the persecution may be based on actual or perceived political affiliation too.[123] Victims in these cases were often targeted because of their civic engagement, public criticism or perceived loyalty to Ukraine. Such targeting reflects discriminatory intent and the deprivation of liberty, exposure to torture and denial of legal protection amounts to severe violations of fundamental rights. These acts were committed in connection with the other crimes enumerated in Art 7 where the legal threshold for persecution is therefore met.[124] Some specific acts do not neatly fall within other enumerated crimes as they may still constitute inhumane acts under Art 7 (1)(k).[125] This provision serves as a residual category. It captures the conduct that causes great suffering or serious injury and is of comparable gravity to other crimes against humanity.[126] The international jurisprudence confirms that severe beatings, deplorable detention conditions and forced witnessing of violence may qualify as inhumane acts.[127]

III.   Cases revealing accountability-challenges arising from jurisdictional, political and evidentiary constraints in prosecuting CAH committed vis-à-vis Ukraine conflict:

Olha Haisumova:

The abduction and secret detention of Ukrainian civil society actors during the Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory raises issue that extend beyond individual human rights violation and enters into the domain of international criminal responsibility. One illustrative case is that of Olha Haisumova, a Ukrainian activist whose treatment exemplifies how localised acts of repression may contribute to the legal characterization of crimes against humanity under Art 7 of the ICC statute. She was a prominent civilian activist in Melitopol and served as the head of the non-governmental organisation Melitopol Conscious Society. Her activities included organising and participating in peaceful demonstrations opposing the Russian occupation of the city in March 2022.[128] These actions placed her within the civilian population engaging in political expression, the conduct that remains protected under IHL. It was on 12th of March, while Melitopol was under effective Russian military occupation, she was forcibly taken by armed man during a public rally demanding the release of the city’s mayor Ivan Fedorov, who had been detained by Russian forces one day earlier.[129] Contemporary reporting and witness accounts have identified the perpetrators as Russian soldiers or individuals acting under their authority.[130] The abduction occurred in public and without any attempt to invoke legal authority, judicial process or formal arrest procedures. This deprivation of liberty satisfied the first material element of enforced disappearance as defined in Art 7 (2)(i) of the ICC statute namely the arrest, detention and abduction of persons by or without the authorisation, support or acquiescence of a State or political organisation.[131] The ICC has interpreted this element very broadly by encompassing any involuntary deprivation of liberty carried out against a person's will.[132] The circumstances surrounding Miss. Haisumova fall squarely within this interpretation.

Following her abduction, she was held in conditions of secrecy for approximately nine days. She was reportedly restrained, confined in a basement and kept with a bag over her head. During this period, she was subjected to psychological pressure and coerced into signing documents as a condition for her release.[133] No judicial oversight was exercised and no formal charges were brought. These facts were later disclosed only through unofficial channels and through her own testimony after her release. The refusal to acknowledge her detention or to provide information regarding her fate or whereabouts engages the second constitutive element of enforced disappearance. The Russian authorities did not register her detention and they did not even inform her family. They did not disclose the location of her confinement.[134] Under international law such refusal is not merely evidentiary but constitutive of the crime itself. The Human Rights Committee has consistently held that States have a positive obligation to investigate disappearances ex officio and to clarify the fate of the disappeared person.[135] The concealment of Ms. Haisumova's detention also inflicted a serious mental suffering on her relatives. The international jurisprudence recognises that enforced disappearance causes anguish, distress and continuing harm to family members who may themselves be considered indirect victims of inhuman-treatment[136] due to the anguish and uncertainty surrounding the victim's fate. This dimension reinforces the gravity of the offence and its cumulative impact on civilian population. The manner in which she was deprived of liberty permits an inference of an intent to remove her from the protection of the law satisfying the third defining element of enforced disappearance under the Rome Statute. She was detained without a warrant, held in an undisclosed location, denied access to legal remedies and released only after coercion. Such factors have been identified by the ICC Pre Trail Chamber as indicative of intent under Art 7 (2)(i).[137] Although her detention did not extend for months or years but lasted for days. The ICC Statute does not prescribe a minimum temporal threshold. The ICC had clarified that a prolong period must be determined contextually and that secrecy, coercion and legal invisibility may satisfy the requirement give when detention is measured in days rather than months.[138] Accordingly the temporal element does not preclude its characterization of the conduct as enforced disappearance. Parallel the facts also support qualification under Art 7(1)(e) of the ICC Statute which criminalises imprisonment or other deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law.[139] She was deprived of liberty without due process, judicial oversight or lawful justification. Such detention violates peremptory norms prohibiting arbitrary detention and satisfy the gravity threshold required for crimes against humanity when committed as part of a broader attack on civilians.[140] The targeting of Miss Haisumova further engages the CAH of persecution under Art 7 (1)(h).[141] She was targeted on political grounds due to her perceived opposition to Russian occupation. Political opinion constitutes a protective ground[142] and the severe deprivation of her liberty and exposure to coercive treatment reflects the denial of fundamental rights. The repetition of similar acts across multiple location and against diverse civilian victims supports the conclusion that such conduct formed part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian population.[143] Accordingly the enforced disappearance and unlawful detention of Miss Haisumova contribute to the legal characterization of humanity under Art 7 of the ICC statute. Her case demonstrates how individual acts of repression transcend isolated illegality and enter the realm of international criminal responsibility.

Serhiy Tsyhipa:

Being a Ukrainian civic activist and a blogger, he was known for his public opposition to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[144] His activities were visible and sustained as he regularly disseminated pro-Ukrainian commentary through social media platforms such Facebook.[145] He had severely criticized the Russian occupation and encouraged civilian resistance in Nova Kakhovka, a city under Russian occupation.[146]It was on 12th of March 2022 when he suddenly disappeared from the city Nova Kakhovka, and the witnesses accounts that his disappearance was not voluntary.[147] No arrest warrant was issued and no official ground for detention were communicated. From this date onwards the Russian authorities had failed to acknowledge his deprivation of liberty where his fate and whereabouts remain undisclosed.[148] Before his disappearance he had been targeted because of his perceived political alignment. His activism was not covert but it was public, expressive, and oppositional. This visibility placed him within a category of civilians systematically targeted during the occupation. His disappearance therefore cannot be understood as an isolated incident as it forms part of a broader pattern of repression detected against individuals perceived as resistance to Russian control.[149] There are credible reports which have suggested that he was subjected to coercion while he was kept in captivity. He was allegedly tortured into contacting Ukrainian journalist Oleh Baturin.[150] He was even forced to arrange a meeting under duress and that meeting resulted in sudden abduction of Baturin subsequently.[151] This conduct reflects the instrumentalization of enforced disappearance as a tool of intimidation and expansion of the attack against the civilian population. This also demonstrates the interlink nature of violations committed in occupied territory. 

About more than six months after his disappearance no official information has been provided to his family.[152] There were request for clarification but even those went unanswered. No place of detention had been identified and no legal proceedings have been disclosed.[153] This sustained refusal to acknowledge detention actually satisfies a central constituent element of enforced disappearance under Art 7(2)(i) of the ICC statute. The prolonged concealment removes the victim from the protection of the law.[154] From the perspective of ICL the facts surrounding his disappearance disclose the material elements of multiple crime against humanity. His deprivation of liberty occurred without the due process. It therefore constitutes an imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of the final rules of international law under Art 7(1)(e).[155] The concealment of his fate combined with the involvement of state agents or their proxies satisfies the additional elements required for enforced disappearance under Art 7(1)(i).[156]The political context of his targeting is legally significant as he was selected because of his actual or perceived political opposition. The deprivation of his liberty and the denial of legal protection were imposed on discriminatory grounds. Such conduct falls within the definition of persecution under Art 7(1)(h)[157] which criminalises the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights by reason of their political identity.[158] The ICC jurisprudence confirms that persecution may be constituted through conduct that also qualifies as other CAH where discriminatory intent has been established.[159]The European Union had publicly condemned the abduction and disappearance of him. They had denounced the Russian practices involved in targeting of civilians, journalists, civil society actors.[160] This act of condemnation has reinforced the conclusion that his disappearance occurred within a widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian population. The attack was carried out pursuant to a state policy and it was not episodic or accidental. This enforced disappearance of him exemplifies the convergence of imprisonment, enforced disappearance and persecution as integrated within the definition of crimes against humanity under Art 7 of the ICC statute. This conduct demonstrates how political repression in occupied territory operates through layered violations and each violation reinforces the other. Together, they form a part of a coherent pattern of international crimes attracting individual criminal responsibility.

Serhii Liubych and Yevhen Guryanov:

Both Serhii Liubych and Yevhen Guryanov were civilian volunteers who were engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in areas under Russian military contribution during the early phase of the invasion of Ukraine. There activities were neither clandestine nor militarized as they were limited to transporting food, water and other essential supplies to civilians affected by hostilities. The two men are related through marriage as Mr Liubych's wife and Mr. Guryanov's wife are sisters.[161]Their disappearance occurred with a broader pattern of abduction targeting humanitarian volunteers operating in Russian control regions. There were multiple reports which document that the Russian forces treated the distribution of humanitarian aid as a prerogative of occupying power. The civilian volunteers who continued such activities without authorisation were frequently detained.[162] This context is legally relevant as it situates the disappearances of Liubych and Guryanov within a systematic attack against civilian population. Mr Liubych resided in Bucha with his family during the occupation. It was on 7th of March 2022 he left his home to transport drinking water from Bucha to Hostomel. He did not return. The eye witnesses reported that the Russian soldiers had detailed him shortly after he exited his vehicle. A bag was placed over his head and he was then taken away by force.[163] No warrant was produced, no explanation was given and his detention was never formally registered. His vehicle was later discovered in Hostomel following the de-occupation of the area in April 2022[164] and yet his whereabouts remain unknown. During the same period Mr. Guryanov undertook humanitarian work in Bucha as he delivered food and water and assisted those civilians awaiting evacuation. It was on 18th of March 2022 the Russian soldiers raided his home and took him into custody.[165] The witness testimony placed him in detention near the Antonov airport in Hostomel.[166] On 23rd march 2022 Mr Guryanov was transferred across an international border and taken to a filtration camp in Norovlia, Belarus.[167] After two days he was reportedly moved again and placed in a Pre-Trial detention facility in Norozybkov located in the Bryansk region of the Russian federation.[168] This cross border transfer occurred without judicial oversight and without notification to his family. After several months following their disappearance, the Russian authorities refused to acknowledge the detention of either of them. There was no official information given to the family members and requests for clarification were ignored. It was in August 2022 the Russian federation had confirmed their detention. This confirmation arrived through the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross).[169] The letter issued by the Russian Ministry of defence stated that both men were detained for ‘countering special military operation’.[170] It did not disclose their precise location but it explicitly refused to provide such information to third parties.[171] This limited acknowledgement did not cure the underlying violation as it neither restored the legal protection nor were they given any access to judicial remedies. The subsequent eyewitness testimony continued to place both men in the detention facility at Novozybkov.[172] They have been held in largely incommunicado and no access to legal counsel was given to them. There were undated letters which reached their families. The message sent was too brief to be understood more than that the sender was alive and well; the letters did not have the information regarding the place of detention, no dates, no return address was provided.[173] From the stand point of ICL, these facts disclose the elements of multiple CAH under Art 7 of the ICC statute. The initial apprehension of both men constituted the severe deprivation of physical liberty as it was carried out without due process. These elements therefore satisfy the material element of imprisonment under Art 7(1)(e).[174] The prolonged concealment of their fate and whereabouts combined with state involvement actually satisfy the additional elements of enforced disappearance under Art 7 (1)(i) and Art 7(2)(i).[175] The context in which these acts occur further supports their characterization as CAH as the abductions were not isolated. This occurred during an occupation marked by repeated targeting of humanitarian volunteers. The conduct was geographically dispersed as the victims were civilians. The pattern reflects a policy aimed at suppressing independent humanitarian activity and civilian solidarity. Such targeting when directed against individuals because of their perceived alignment with the civilian population rather than the occupying power may also constitute persecution under Art 7(1)(h).[176] Hence the disappearances of Serhii Liubych and Yevhen Guryanov illustrate how enforced disappearance, imprisonment and persecution operate in concert with a single factual matrix. Each offence reinforces each other. Largely this reflects the structure of Art 7 and the lived reality of violations in the occupied Ukraine. 

Arkadij Dovzhenko:

Arkadij Dovzhenko, a Ukrainian Human Rights defender who became publicly active in opposition to the Russian invasion following 24th February 2022, resided in a city which fell under the Russian military occupation during the early phase of the conflict. As Russian forces consolidated their control he began participating in and helping organise peaceful demonstrations against the invasions and occupation.[177] His activism was visibly both in physical protest and in digital space. He would regularly post critical content on social media platforms including Facebook and Instagram thereby expressing clear opposition to the occupying authorities.[178] On 21st March 2022 the Russian troops violently dispersed a peaceful protest in Kherson attended by Mr. Dovzhenko. Ammunitions were reportedly fired and tear gas was used against demonstrators where the independent media outlets documented Russian forces opening fire on unarmed civilians participating in the protest.[179] Following this incident, he formed the belief that he was being monitored by Russian troops and the intensity of repression against protest leaders increased thereafter. 

April 21^st, 2022 marks the day when he was abducted by two-armed men carrying automatic weapons. He was forcibly restrained post into a vehicle and taken away against his will.[180] No arrest warrant was shown and no explanation was given. The operation was an arbitrary action rather than a lawful arrest. He was transported to a building that he later identified as a police facility. The Russian soldiers were present inside and other Ukrainian civilians were also being held there in captivity.[181] He was detained incommunicado for approximately one week and during the period his family members received no official information regarding his fate or whereabouts. While he was in detention he was subjected to repeated torture where the abuse was systematic rather than incidental as it occurred daily. Consequently, he sustained serious physical injuries including broken ribs and fractured knee caps.[182] The treatment inflicted caused severe physical pain and lasting bodily harm. From the stand point of ICL the facts of his abduction and detention disclose multiple CAH under Art 7 – Rome Statute. His possible confinement without a judicial process constituted imprisonment and other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of Art 7 (1)(e).[183] The concealment of his detention during the period of incommunicado confinement further satisfies the element of enforced disappearance under Art 7 (1)(i) and Art 7(2)(i).[184] The political motivation underlying his targeting is legally salient as he was not selected at random but was identified because of his role in organising protest and publicly opposing the occupation. The deprivation of liberty and infliction of violence was imposed on discriminative political ground and this conduct therefore falls within the scope of persecution as a CAH under Art 7 (1)(h), thereby criminalising the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights by reason of their political identity or perceived political affiliation.[185] The repeated torture inflicted during detention further aggravates the criminality of the conduct with torture constitutes an autonomous CAH under Art 7(1)(f).[186] It reinforces the gravity of the imprisonment and disappearance where also supporting the qualification as an inhumane act under Art 7 (1)(k),[187] where the suffering inflicted is comparable in seriousness to other enumerated crimes. When assessed within the broader context of repression in occupied Kherson, his case reflects conduct carried out as part of a widespread and systematic attack against civilian population. The attack targets in activists and protest leaders as this was executed in furtherance of an occupation policy aimed at suppressing civilian resistance. In this setting his abduction detention and torture engage individual criminal responsibility for the CAH under Art 7 of the ICC statute.

Conclusive observations:

The conduct of the Russian forces and their occupation authorities in Ukraine plausibly satisfies both the contextual and material elements of crimes against humanity under Art. 7 of the Rome Statute. The evidence demonstrates that the violence directed at Ukrainian civilians cannot be understood as isolated breaches of ICL. Instead, it reflects a sustained pattern of conduct involving multiple enumerated acts including murder, torture, enforced disappearance, imprisonment, deportation, sexual violence, persecution and other inhumane acts. These acts occurred across a wide geographic area and over an extended period of time, affecting diverse civilian groups such as journalists, activists, educators, religious leaders and ordinary residents of Ukrainian territories. The research therefore concludes that the legal threshold for the crimes against humanity is met independently of the existence of an armed conflict and without the need to demonstrate a formalized written state policy. The research concludes that the documented atrocities function as interconnected components by a broader, organized attack aimed at suppressing Ukrainian civilian identity and resistance, rather than as discrete and opportunistic violations. The analysis of enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention, torture and persecution reveals a coherent pattern in which individual incidents reinforce one another. Civilians were often targeted because of their political opinion, civic engagement, humanitarian work or perceived loyalty to Ukraine. Enforced disappearances served not only to remove specific individuals from public life but also to instill fear, dismantle civic society networks and deter resistance within the occupied population. Torture, sexual violence and in communicado detention were routinely employed as tools of coercion and intimidation, demonstrating that such abuses were embedded in occupation practices rather than exceptional misconduct. The cumulative effect of those acts reflects an organized attack directed primarily at the civilian population carried out with the knowledge of a broader campaign. The research therefore finds that crimes such as enforced disappearance, persecution and torture must be understood relationally as mutually reinforcing elements of a widespread and systematic attack within the meaning of Art 7 (2)(a).

The research also identifies significant legal and accountability challenges in prosecuting crimes against humanity committed in Ukraine, despite a strong evidentiary and doctrinal foundation. While international investigative bodies have documented evidence of crimes against humanity, the jurisdictional or political constraints continue to limit effective accountability. The ICC's restricted jurisdiction, the absence of custody over high-level perpetrators, evidentiary difficulties arising from ongoing hostilities and geo-political resistance to enforcement mechanisms hinder comprehensive prosecution. At the same time, the research highlights the importance of domestic prosecutions, universal jurisdiction cases, and coordinated international investigations as complementary avenues for accountability. The findings underscore that although the legal characterization of Russian conduct as CAH is well supported, translating legal qualification into judicial outcomes remains a challenge for international criminal law. This gap between legal recognition and enforcement, exposes structural weakness in the current accountability framework and calls for strengthening international cooperation and institutional reform.

[1] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.                                                                                              

[2] (a) 'Attack directed against any civilian population" means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack; (b) "Extermination" includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population; (c) "Enslavement" means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children; (d) "Deportation or forcible transfer of population" means forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law; (e) "Torture" means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions; (f) "Forced pregnancy" means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of international law. This definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy;(g) "Persecution" means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity; (h) "The crime of apartheid" means inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime

[3] Rome Statute art. 7.

[4] Hiren & S.K. Bose, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity under the Rome Statute: Challenges in Prosecution, 8 Int’l J. L. Mgmt. & Human. 3910 (2025), https://ijlmh.com/wp-content/uploads/War-Crimes-and-Crimes-against-Humanity-under-the-Rome-Statute.pdf.

[5] Gerhard Kemp & Windell Nortje, Prosecuting the Crime against Humanity of Apartheid: The Historic First Indictment in South Africa and the Application of Customary International Law, 21 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 405 (2023), https://academic.oup.com/jicj/article/21/2/405/7231934.

[6] Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, U.N. Human Rights Council (2026); Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Impact of Hostilities on Children in Ukraine, U.N. Doc. (Mar. 21, 2025); S.C. Press Release, Security Council Meeting on Ukraine: Deportation and Transfer of Children, U.N. Doc. SC/15395 (Aug. 24, 2023); Reuters, Russia’s Deportation of Ukrainian Children Amounts to Crimes Against Humanity, UN Inquiry Finds (Mar. 10, 2026); ABC News, Russian Deportations of Ukrainian Children Constitute Crimes Against Humanity (Mar. 11, 2026).

[7] ibid

[8] Gwendolyn Sasse, Crimea and the Displacement of Crimean Tatars: Identity, Repression, and Resistance, in Russia and Eurasia: The Politics of Post-Soviet Space 143 (Stephen White & Zvi Gitelman eds., Routledge 2018).

[9] Rebecca Hamilton, Filtration Camps and the Crime of Deportation: Legal Accountability for Russia’s Actions in Ukraine, 21 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 487 (2023).

[10] Peter Dickinson, UN Report: Russia Is Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity in Occupied Ukraine, Atlantic Council (Mar. 27, 2025), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/un-report-russia-guilty-of-crimes-against-humanity-in-occupied-ukraine

[11] Tetyana Vysotska & Oleksandr Shumilin, "A Total Sham, Held at Gunpoint": EU Comments on Witkoff’s Statement About Russian Referendums in Ukrainian Occupied Territories, Ukrainska Pravda (Mar. 24, 2025), https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/03/24/7504300/ 

[12] Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/58/67 (Mar. 19, 2025), https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/iicihr-ukraine/index

[13] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2024: Ukraine (2024).

[14] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(1), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

[15] Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 415–18 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001).

[16] U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Ukraine, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/55/CRP.1 (2024).

[17] U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Ukraine: Civilian Casualties Update (Nov. 2024).

[18] U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Ukraine Refugee Situation (2024).

[19] U.N. Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, Attacks on Ukraine’s Electricity Infrastructure Threaten Key Aspects of Life (Sept. 19, 2024); U.N. Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (Jan. 2025); Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ukraine Faces Intensified Attacks on Energy Infrastructure Amid Continued High Civilian Casualties (Nov. 12, 2025); U.N. Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, Russian Attacks on Ukraine’s Energy Infrastructure Deepen Civilian Hardship Ahead of Winter (Oct. 31, 2025); U.N. Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, 2025 Deadliest Year for Civilians in Ukraine Since 2022 (Jan. 12, 2026); U.N. Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, Energy Attacks Amid an Unusually Harsh Winter Are Exposing Ukraine’s Civilians to Extreme Hardship (Feb. 13, 2026); UNICEF, Ukraine Humanitarian Situation Report No. 57 (Oct. 2025); Physicians for Human Rights, Health Care in the Dark: The Impacts of Russian Attacks on Energy in Ukraine (Dec. 4, 2024).

[20] Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(a), (k).

[21] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2024: Ukraine (2024).

[22] U.N. OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (2023).

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(a).

[26] U.N. OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (2023).

[27] Id.

[28] Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(f).

[29] U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/54/CRP.4 (Aug. 2023).

[30] Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(g).

[31] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2024: Ukraine (2024).

[32] Id.

[33] Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(k).

[34] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2024: Ukraine (2024).

[35] U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/52/62 (Mar. 2023).

[36] Crimean Tatar Resource Center, Human Rights Violations in Occupied Crimea (2024).

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] U.N. OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (2024).

[40] U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Ukraine, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/55/CRP.1 (2024).

[41] Claus Kreß, On the Limits of ICC Jurisdiction, 23 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 1 (2023).

[42] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Ukraine (2025).

[43] Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 415–18 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001).

[44] U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Ukraine, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/55/CRP.1 (2024).

[45] U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Ukraine: Civilian Casualties Update (Nov. 2024).

[46] U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Ukraine Refugee Situation (2024).

[47] Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(a).

[48] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Ukraine (2025).

[49] Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(k).

[50] Situation in Ukraine, ICC-01/22, Arrest Warrants (2024).

[51] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Ukraine (2025).

[52] Id.

[53] Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(a).

[54] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Ukraine (2025).

[55] U.N. OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (2024).

[56] Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 418 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001).

[57] World Health Organization, Surveillance of Attacks on Healthcare in Ukraine (2024).

[58] Id.

[59] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Ukraine (2025).

[60] Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment, ¶ 1106 (Mar. 7, 2014).

[61] Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 43 (1907).

[62] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Ukraine (2025).

[63] ibid

[64] U.N. OHCHR, Human Rights Situation in Ukraine (2024).

[65] Rome Statute, supra note 132, art. 7(1)(f).

[66] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025: Ukraine (2025).

[67] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(1)(g), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

[68] U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Arbitrary Detention and Enforced Disappearance in Ukraine (2024).

[69] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(1)(e), (i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90

[70] Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment, ¶¶ 1110–12 (Mar. 7, 2014).

[71] Claus Kreß, On the Limits of ICC Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression, 23 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 1, 6–8 (2023).

[72] Rome Statute, art. 7.

[73] Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 415–18 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001).

[74] United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, Plight of Civilians in Ukraine (May 10, 2022).

[75] Human Rights Watch, Russia: Forcible Disappearances of Ukrainian Civilians (July 14, 2022).

[76] Rome Statute art. 7(2)(i).

[77] U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/56/CRP.1 (2025).

[78] Id. ¶¶ 45–60.

[79] Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 206 (ICTY Mar. 3, 2000).

[80] Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: Torture, Disappearances in Occupied South (July 22, 2022).

[81] Katanga, ¶¶ 1110–12.

[82] Rome Statute art. 7(1)(i).

[83] Id. art. 7(2)(i).

[84] U.N. Comm’n of Inquiry on Ukraine, ¶¶ 91–104.

[85] Id.

[86] U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Remarks on Russia’s Filtration Operations (Sept. 7, 2022).

[87] U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine (June 2022).

[88] Rome Statute art. 7(1)(f).

[89] U.N. Comm’n of Inquiry on Ukraine, supra note 8, ¶ 173.

[90] Id. ¶¶ 181–194.

[91] Rome Statute art. 7(1)(g).

[92] Id. art. 7(1)(e).

[93] Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (2014).

[94] Human Rights Watch, Russia: Forcible Disappearances of Ukrainian Civilians (July 14, 2022).

[95] Rome Statute art. 7(1)(d).

[96] Id. art. 7(1)(h).

[97] U.N. Comm’n of Inquiry on Ukraine, supra note 8, ¶¶ 105–118.

[98] Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment, ¶ 431 (ICTY Mar. 15, 2002).

[99] Kunarac, ¶ 418.

[100] Kunarac, ¶ 418.

[101] Claus Kreß, On the Limits of ICC Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression, 23 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 1, 6–8 (2023).

[102] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(1), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

[103] Human Rights Watch, Russia: Forcible Disappearances of Ukrainian Civilians (July 14, 2022).

[104] ICC, Situation in the Republic of Burundi, Decision Pursuant to Article 15, ¶ 119, ICC-01/17-X (Nov. 9, 2017).

[105] Human Rights Watch, Russia: Forcible Disappearances of Ukrainian Civilians (July 14, 2022).

[106] ICC, Situation in the Republic of Burundi, Decision Pursuant to Article 15, ¶ 117, ICC-01/17-X (Nov. 9, 2017).

[107] ICC, Situation in the Republic of Burundi, Decision Pursuant to Article 15, ¶ 118, ICC-01/17-X (Nov. 9, 2017).

[108] Human Rights Committee, Sarma v. Sri Lanka, Comm. No. 950/2000, ¶ 11 (2003).

[109] Letter from Russian Ministry of Defense (Aug. 2022) (on file with Center for Civil Liberties).

[110] Human Rights Committee, Almeida de Quinteros v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 107/1981, ¶ 14 (1990).

[111] ICC, Situation in the Republic of Burundi, Decision Pursuant to Article 15, ¶ 120, ICC-01/17-X (Nov. 9, 2017).

[112] Id.

[113] Id.

[114] Rome Statute art. 7(1)(e).

[115] Id.

[116] U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Rep., ¶ 79, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/44 (2012).

[117] Prosecutor v. Yekatom & Ngaïssona, ICC-01/14-01/18, Decision on Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 119 (Dec. 11, 2019).

[118] Committee Against Torture, Gen. Comment No. 2, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (2008).

[119] Rome Statute art. 7(1)(f).

[120] Id. art. 7(1)(h).

[121] Id. art. 7(2)(g).

[122] Id.

[123] Prosecutor v. Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15, Trial Judgment, ¶ 2737 (Feb. 4, 2021).

[124] Id. ¶¶ 2731–36.

[125] Rome Statute art. 7(1)(k).

[126] Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 452 (Sept. 30, 2008).

[127] Prosecutor v. Ongwen, supra note 30, ¶ 2744.

[128] Roman Petrenko, In Melitopol, the Protest Coordinator Was Kidnapped by Activists, Ukr. Pravda (Mar. 12, 2022), https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/12/7330665/ (unofficial translation).

[129] Hayla Coynash, Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov Abducted After Refusing to Collaborate with the Russian Invaders, Kharkiv Hum. Rts. Prot. Grp. (Mar. 12, 2022), https://khpg.org/en/1608810181.

[130] Euromaidan Press (@EuromaidanPress), Twitter (Mar. 12, 2022), https://twitter.com/euromaidanpress/status/1502576996819386377; see also ZMINA, In Kherson Region, Activist Serhiy Tsyhipa Disappeared, https://zmina.info/news/na-hersonshhyni-znyk-aktyvist-sergij-czygipa/.

[131] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(2)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

[132] ICC, Situation in the Republic of Burundi, Decision Pursuant to Article 15, ¶ 117, ICC-01/17-X (Nov. 9, 2017).

[133] Zaporozhie Investigative Center, “Russian World” in Melitopol: Searches, Kidnapping, and Torture (Apr. 20, 2022), https://incentre.zp.ua/russian-world-in-melitopol-searches-kidnapping-and-torture/ (unofficial translation).

[134] RIA-M.tv, Seven Days with a Bag on Her Head: Activist from Melitopol Olha Haisumova Speaks About Her Time in Captivity (Mar. 21, 2022), https://ria-m.tv/news/280976/sem_dney_s_meshkom_na_golove_aktivistka_iz_melitopolya_olga_gaysumova_rasskazala_o_svoem_prebyivanii_v_plenu.html (unofficial translation).

[135] Rome Statute art. 7(2)(i).

[136] Human Rights Committee, Almeida de Quinteros v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 107/1981, ¶ 14 (1990).

[137] ICC, Situation in the Republic of Burundi, Decision Pursuant to Article 15, ¶ 120, ICC-01/17-X (Nov. 9, 2017).

[138] Id.

[139] Rome Statute art. 7(1)(e)

[140] U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Rep., ¶ 79, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/44 (2012).

[141] Rome Statute art. 7(1)(h).

[142] Prosecutor v. Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 2731–36 (Feb. 4, 2021).

[143] U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Ukraine, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/56/CRP.1 (2025).

[144] Oleksandr Yankovskiy, Volodymyr Mykhaylov & Yevhenia Tokar, In a Ukrainian Region Occupied by Russian Forces, People Are Disappearing. Locals Fear It’s About to Get Worse, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Mar. 16, 2022), https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-invasion-kherson-disappearances-russia-kidnapping/31756418.html.

[145] Serhiy Tsyhipa (@tsyhipa), Facebook (last visited Sept. 22, 2022), https://www.facebook.com/tsyhipa?fref=mentions.

[146] See, e.g., European Union External Action Service, Ukraine: Statement by the Spokesperson on the Abductions of Ukrainian Civilians by Russian Occupation Forces (Mar. 20, 2022).

[147] See Human Rights Watch, Russia: Forcible Disappearances of Ukrainian Civilians (July 14, 2022).

[148] Id.

[149] U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/52/62 (2023).

[150] Halya Coynash, Kherson journalist kidnapped by Russian invaders after reporting their violent suppression of a peaceful protest, Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group (Apr. 6, 2022), https://khpg.org/en/1608810349.

[151] See Oleh Baturin, Account of Abduction in Kherson Region, Ukrainska Pravda (Apr. 2022).

[152] See, e.g., What Russian forces are doing to the population of southern Ukraine – Human Rights Watch report, Zerkalo (July 25, 2022), https://news.zerkalo.io/world/18545.html; Local journalist goes missing in Kakhovka, Pravda (Mar. 12, 2022), https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/12/7330838; Halya Coynash, Ukrainian journalist Oleh Baturin feared abducted by Russian invaders in Kherson oblast, Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group (Mar. 13, 2022); Committee to Protect Journalists, Ukrainian journalist Oleh Baturyn released 8 days after going missing (Mar. 20, 2022), https://cpj.org/2022/03/ukrainian-journalist-oleh-baturyn-released-8-days-after-going-missing/.

[153] See Human Rights Watch, Russia: Forcible Disappearances of Ukrainian Civilians (July 14, 2022).

[154] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(2)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

[155] Id. art. 7(1)(e).

[156] Id. art. 7(1)(i).

[157] Id. art. 7(1)(h)

[158] Id. art. 7(2)(g).

[159] Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 2731–37 (Feb. 4, 2021).

[160] See, e.g., European Union External Action Service, Ukraine: Statement by the Spokesperson on the Abductions of Ukrainian Civilians by Russian Occupation Forces (Mar. 20, 2022).

[161] Information provided by family members to the Center for Civil Liberties (on file).

[162] Jake Tapper, Nine Volunteer Drivers on Rescue Mission to Mariupol Detained by Russian Forces, Aid Group Says, CNN (Apr. 11, 2022); Joshua Yaffa, A Ukrainian City Under a Violent New Regime, NEW YORKER (May 16, 2022); Halya Coynash, Russia Abducts 25 Volunteers Delivering Humanitarian Aid to Mariupol, KHARKIV HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION GROUP (June 3, 2022); Bogdana Bondarenko, Russian Army Treatment of Ukrainian Civilians, EU POL. REP. (Aug. 2, 2022).

[163] Human Rights Watch, Russia: Forcible Disappearances of Ukrainian Civilians (July 14, 2022); Center for Civil Liberties, Interviews with Families (notes on file).

[164] Center for Civil Liberties, Interviews with Families (notes on file).

[165] Human Rights Watch, Russia: Forcible Disappearances of Ukrainian Civilians, (July 14, 2022).

[166] Center for Civil Liberties, Interviews with Families (notes on file); Let My People Go, Tweet (Aug. 15, 2022).

[167] Id.

[168] Information provided by a witness released as part of a witness exchange, Center for Civil Liberties (notes on file).

[169] Copy of Letter from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (Aug. 17, 2022) (on file with Center for Civil Liberties).

[170] Id.

[171] Id.

[172] Human Rights Watch, Russia: Forcible Disappearances of Ukrainian Civilians, supra note 3; Information provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross to the Center for Civil Liberties (on file).

[173] Information provided by family members to the Center for Civil Liberties (on file).

[174] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(1)(e), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

[175] Id. art. 7(1)(i), art. 7(2)(i).

[176] Id. art. 7(1)(h), art. 7(2)(g).

[177] Interview with Arkadij Dovzhenko (June 29, 2022) (notes on file with the American Bar Association).

[178] Id.

[179] see also U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/52/62 (2023).

[180] Center for Civil Liberties, Interview with Arkadij Dovzhenko (on file).

[181] Interview with Arkadij Dovzhenko (June 29, 2022) (notes on file with the American Bar Association).

[182] Id.; see also Human Rights Watch, Ukraine: Torture, Disappearances in Occupied South (July 22, 2022), https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/22/ukraine-torture-disappearances-occupied-south (describing the circumstances of his abduction and the torture Mr. Dovzhenko suffered in detention).

[183] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(1)(e), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

[184] Id. art. 7(1)(i), art. 7(2)(i).

[185] Id. art. 7(1)(h).

[186] Id. art. 7(1)(f).

[187] Id. art. 7(1)(k).